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ZAUDERER V. OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO: STATES' RIGHTS V.
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Attorney Phillip Q. Zauderer ran the following newspaper adver-
tisement.
DID YOU USE THIS IUD?
The Dalkon Shield Interuterine Device is alleged to have caused
serious pelvic infections resulting in hospitalizations, tubal dam-
age, infertility, and hysterectomies. It is also alleged to have
caused unplanned pregnancies ending in abortions, miscarriages,
septic abortions, tubal or ectopic pregnancies, and full-term
deliveries. If you or a friend have had a similar experience do
not assume it is too late to take legal action against the Shield's
manufacturer. Our law firm is presently representing women on
such cases. The cases are handled on a contingent fee basis of
the amount recovered. If there is no recovery, no legal fees are
owed by our clients.
An eye catching drawing of the Dalkon Shield Intrauterine Device
(IUD) formed the left border of the advertisement, which concluded
with a number to call for free information, and the name and address
of Zauderer's firm.'
This advertisement attracted over two hundred inquiries and led to
the filing of one hundred and six lawsuits. Subsequently, the Disciplinary
Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio (Disciplinary Counsel) filed a
complaint against Zauderer alleging several violations of the Ohio Dis-
ciplinary Rules. The Supreme Court of Ohio, which ultimately accepted
the recommendation of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
Discipline 2 publicly reprimanded Zauderer for violating five disciplinary
rules,3 and he appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Zauderer
v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 105
S.Ct. 2265 (1985).
Justice White, writing for the majority, framed the major issues as
whether the State could discipline an attorney for violating any of the
* Copyright 1986, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
i. Appellant's Brief, Fiche 70, Docket No. 83-2166, 1985 term.
2. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Zauderer, 10 Ohio St. 3d 44, 461 N.E.2d 883
(1984).
3. Zauderer v. Supreme Court of Ohio, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2284 (1985).
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"three separate forms of regulation Ohio has imposed on advertising
by its attorneys: prohibitions on soliciting legal business through ad-
vertisements containing advice and information regarding specific legal
problems; restrictions on the use of illustrations in advertising by lawyers;
and disclosure requirements relating to the terms of contingency fees." '4
This note will examine the holdings of Zauderer in light of other
United States Supreme Court commercial speech decisions,' define the
remaining authority of the states to regulate attorney advertising, and
identify the resulting parameters of the attorney's right to advertise.
Background
The American Bar Association adopted a formal ban on attorney
advertising and solicitation for the first time in 1908. The justifications
for the prohibition were two-fold: preventing the breakdown of the
family unit by banning divorce solicitation, and the absence of a real
need for such advertising at a time when one's reputation and family
ties were known to all in the community. 6
In the 1942 case of Valentine v. Chrestensen,7 the Supreme Court
first held that commercial speech was not protected by the First Amend-
ment. However, a gradual weakening of this holding followed, and in
1976, the Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Counsel, Inc., concluded that commercial speech does not
lack all protection of the First Amendment. 8 The Supreme Court first
addressed the issue of attorney advertising as commercial speech a year
later in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,9 where it stated that the ban
on advertising by attorneys "originated as a rule of etiquette and not
as a rule of ethics.'
'0
Bates had advertised routine services offered by his legal clinic at
"very reasonable fees."" The Court rejected all arguments supporting
a complete ban of attorney advertising but said that states are permitted
to regulate the content of attorney advertising which is false, deceptive,
misleading, or which concerns an illegal transaction, and are permitted
to place reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of these
advertisements. 2
4. Id. at 2275.
5. The United States Supreme Court first characterized attorney advertising as com-
mercial speech in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977).
6. L. Andrews, Birth of a Salesman: Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation 1 (1980).
Abraham Lincoln advertised his law firm in the Sangamo Journal in 1838. Id.
7. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 62 S. Ct. 920 (1942).
8. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976).
9. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977).
10. Id. at 71, 97 S. Ct. at 2702.
II. Id. at 385, 97 S. Ct. at 2710.
12. Id. at 383-84, 97 S. Ct. at 2709.
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In 1978 companion cases, the Court further defined the parameters
of the attorney's right to advertise. In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar As-
sociation,'" an attorney's in-person solicitation of an accident victim in
traction was characterized as "a striking example of the potential for
overreaching that is inherent in a lawyer's in-person solicitation of
professional employment.""' The Court found the prophylactic rule for-
bidding in-person solicitation justified insofar as it furthered the state's
interest in protecting the public from fraud, undue influence, intimi-
dation, and other forms of "vexatious conduct."'" In doing so, the
Court drew a sharp distinction between in-person solicitation and printed
advertising, which allows time for reflection and comparison without
any pressure to make an immediate decision. 6
The second case, In re Primus," concerned solicitation by direct
mail. A letter was sent by an attorney, a member of the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU), advising a victim of free representation offered
by the ACLU. The Court held that direct mail to a known victim was
protected by the First Amendment, when its purpose was not monetary
gain. Since the potential of overreaching was decreased when the attorney
was not meeting the potential client face to face and was not motivated
by monetary gain, the Court rejected the need for a prophylactic rule
and limited the power of the state to regulate to that prescribed in
Bates. 8 The Court did not, however, completely dismiss the issue of
direct mail solicitation. In distinguishing Primus from Ohralik, the Court
emphasized the lack of monetary gain as a motive for the mailing,
leaving open the issue of direct mailing to known victims for monetary
gain.
The issue of direct mail solicitation was again addressed in In re
R.M.J.,20 where a newly admitted member of the bar mailed professional
announcement cards. Though monetary gain was obviously the impetus
for mailing the announcements, the mailing was not to known potential
plaintiffs. Finding no asserted state interest, the Supreme Court struck
down the state law restricting the mailing of announcement cards to
"lawyers, clients, former clients, personal friends and relatives."'2 A
second issue in R.M.J. was the attorney's inclusion of information in
his announcement that was not specifically authorized by the state statute.
13. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 98 S. Ct. 1912 (1978).
14. Id. at 468, 98 S. Ct. at 1925.
15. Id. at 462, 98 S. Ct. at 1921.
16. Id. at 457, 98 S. Ct. at 1919.
17. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 98 S. Ct. 1893 (1978).
18. Id. at 438, 98 S. Ct. at 1908.
19. Id. at 422, 98 S. Ct. at 1899.
20. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 192 S. Ct. 929 (1982).
21. Id. at 206, 102 S. Ct. at 939.
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Because none of the information was misleading and no state interest
was furthered by the restriction, the Court held the restriction uncon-
stitutional under the First Amendment.22
Though not an attorney advertising case, the case offering the most
guidance on handling commercial speech is Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.2 3 Justice Powell, writing
for the majority, set forth the following analysis for commercial speech
cases:
If the communication is neither misleading nor related to un-
lawful activity, the government's power is more circumscribed.
The state must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by
restrictions on commercial speech. Moreover, the regulatory tech-
nique must be in proportion to the interest. The limitation on
expression must be designed carefully to achieve the State's goal.
Compliance with this requirement may be measured by two
criteria. First, the restriction must directly advance the state
interest involved; the regulation may not be sustained if it pro-
vides only ineffective or remote support for the government's
purpose. Second, if the governmental interest could be served
as well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech, the
excessive restrictions cannot survive. 2
4
With this background established, an analysis of the Court's handling
of the issues in Zauderer can begin.
Solicitation
Zauderer's advertisement was attacked as a violation of Ohio Dis-
ciplinary Rule 2-103(A), prohibiting an attorney from "recommend[ing]
employment, as a private practitioner, of himself, his partner, or as-
sociate to non-lawyer who has not sought his advice regarding employ-
ment of a lawyer," 25 and Rule 2-104(A), providing that a lawyer "who
has given unsolicited advice to a layman that he should obtain counsel
to take legal action shall not accept employment resulting from that
advice."12 6 Zauderer claimed that this content regulation exceeded Ohio's
authority to regulate commercial speech under the First Amendment.
Adopting the Disciplinary Counsel's findings that the advertisement
was neither false nor deceptive, the Zauderer Court, consistent with
22. Id. at 205, 102 S. Ct. at 938.
23. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 100 S. Ct. 2343 (1980).
24. Id. at 564, 100 S. Ct. at 2350.
25. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2272-73.
26. Id. at 2273.
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Central Hudson, stated, "our decisions impose on the State the burden
of establishing that prohibiting the use of such statements to solicit or
obtain legal business directly advances a substantial governmental in-
terest." 27 No such state interest was apparent in the state supreme court's
opinion; therefore, the United States Supreme Court read the state court's
reliance on Ohralik as a finding that the same state interests involved
in-person solicitation were a!. , involved with newspaper advertisements.
The Court, however, did not agree that the interests were the same and
found that the dangers associated with in-person solicitation were not
present when dealing with printed advertising. In-person solicitation in-
volves a face-to-face meeting between an attorney trained in the art of
persuasion and the "unsophisticated, injured or distressed lay person.''28
As a result, the lay person may feel pressured for an immediate response
to a one-sided presentation without the opportunity for a comparison
of the terms offered or for reflection to determine his own best interests.
With no written transcript of the conversation, the possibilities for
overreaching abound since the exact communication is not subject to
review. In addition, a personal confrontation may invade the privacy
of the receiver because unlike printed advertising, he cannot avoid further
contact by simply "averting his eyes." 9
Printed advertising eliminates many if not all of these dangers. For
purposes of review and regulation, the exact words are preserved. No
pressure to respond immediately is exerted. Arguably, allowing attorneys
to advertise will invite readers to compare and to make relaxed, well-
informed decisions on whether to consult an attorney in person. Fur-
thermore, when a printed advertisement is involved, an invasion of
privacy is much less likely since the individual can choose not to read
it. Additionally, the Court stated, "[ajlthough some sensitive souls may
have found appellant's advertisement in poor taste, it can hardly be
said to have invaded the privacy of those who read it." 30 In effect,
when the dangers of overreaching and invasion of privacy are not present,
the attorney's right to advertise is likely to outweigh any non-substantial
state interest.
Recognizing that the interests present in Ohralik were absent, the
Zauderer Court searched for other possible state interests. After dis-
missing the traditionally asserted interest of avoiding the encouragement
of litigation,3' the Court pointed out that a state would be on shaky
27. Id. at 2277.
28. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 465, 98 S. Ct. at 1923.
29. Id. at 465 n.25, 98 S. Ct. at 1923.
30. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2277.
31. Bates, 433 U.S. at 375-76, 97 S. Ct. at 2705.
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ground in asserting that litigation is an evil that must be kept to a
minimum:
That our citizens have access to their civil courts is not an evil
to be regretted; rather, it is an attribute of our system of justice
in which we ought to take pride. The State is not entitled to
interfere with that access'by denying its citizens accurate infor-
mation about their legal rights.32
Additionally, Zauderer pointed out that the state's argument holds little
weight when contingency fee advertisements are in question, since an
attorney is not likely to file a suit that has little chance of being won.3
The court also rejected Ohio's argument that its interest in avoiding
regulatory difficulties inherent in attorney advertising which are not
present in other forms of advertising outweighed any constitutional
freedoms of the appellant. Ohio asserted that a prophylactic rule was
required to ensure that attorneys are using only truthful, nondeceptive
advertising and argued that, unlike consumer products which are easily
verified as to being of the price and quality advertised, attorneys advertise
services which are rarely quantifiable before rendered.3 4 The Court,
however, noting that the information in Zauderer's advertisement was
easily verifiable, refused to recognize the state's distinction between
attorney advertising and other forms of commercial advertising, since
there was no evidence that assessing the accuracy of information in
attorney advertisements was as complex as the state claimed. Likewise,
there was no reason to believe that assessing the truth of other forms
of advertising was as simple as Ohio claimed. Additionally, the Court
accused the state of wanting to be spared the trouble of reviewing
advertisements at the expense of the free flow of commercial speech.
The Court found the burden of reviewing attorney advertisements com-
parable to that borne by the Federal Trade Commission(FTC) is reviewing
other forms of advertising, implying that the burden is less than in-
surmountable.35
32. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2278. The Bates Court suggested a more direct sanction
for this problem, noting: "The appropriate response to fraud is a sanction addressed to
that problem alone, not a sanction that unduly burdens a legitimate activity." Bates at
375 n.31, 97 S. Ct. at 2705 n.31. The Zauderer Court expanded this idea by stating that,
"if the State's concern is with abuse of process, it can best achieve its aim by enforcing
sanctions against vexatious litigation." Additionally, the Court has indicated that nuisance
suits, which a client has no right to knowingly file, may be prohibited by states as
advertisements proposing an illegal transaction. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2279 n.12.
33. Official Transcript of Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the United States,
Docket No. 83-2166, Zauderer v. Supreme Court of Ohio (Jan. 7, 1985).
34. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2278.
35. Id. at 2279. The Court, noting that the American Bar Association does not find
weeding out misleading advertisements by attorneys to be unduly burdensome, stated,
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Finding no viable state interest, the Court, reversing the decision
of the Ohio Supreme Court,36 concluded that: "An attorney may not
be disciplined for soliciting legal business through printed advertising
containing truthful and nondeceptive information and advice regarding
the legal rights of potential clients." '37
Justice O'Connor dissented,3" asserting three reasons in support of
a complete ban on attorney advertising: the enhanced possibility for
confusion and deception in dealing with professional services (the same
argument made by Ohio and rejected by the majority); the breakdown of
the dignity of the legal profession; and the attorney's personal interest in
making the advertisement as optimistic as possible rather than repre-
senting the reality of the situation.39
Justice O'Connor argued that attorneys are professionals and have
an obligation to place professional responsibility above pecuniary gain.
She advocated the imposition of prophylactic rules if the state desires
to enforce this ethical duty. She stated further that attorneys will present
the advice most likely to bring a client into the office, advice that is
not disinterested and therefore likely to be misleading. In so stating,
however, she apparently disregarded the Court's earlier dismissal of this
argument in Bates, where the majority stated:
"the ABA's new Model Rules of Professional Conduct eschew all regulation of the content
of advertising that is not 'false or misleading."' Id. at 2279 n.13 (citing ABA Model
Rule of Professional Conduct 7.2 (1983)). In addition, the FTC has concluded that,
"application of a 'false or deceptive' standard to attorney advertising would not pose
problems distinct from those presented by the regulation of advertising generally." Id. at
2279 n.13 (citing Federal Trade Commission Staff Report, Improving Consumer Access
to Legal Services: The Case for Removing Restrictions on Truthful Advertising 149-55
(1984)).
36. Though the Zauderer Court did not restate them, the findings of the Bates Court,
rejecting other reasons for a total ban on attorney advertising, clearly underlie the decision
in Zauderer. A few of the most important findings were: "the tendency of advertising
to enhance competition might be expected to produce pressures on attorneys to reduce
fees," Bates at 371 n.35, 97 S. Ct. at 2706 n.35; "[ulnethical lawyers and dishonest
laymen are likely to meet even though restrictions on advertising exist." Id. at 375 n.31,
97 S. Ct. at 2705 n.31; and "the middle 70067 of our population is not being reached
or served adequately by the legal profession." ABA, Revised Handbook on Prepaid Legal
Services 2 (1972). "Among the reasons for this underutilization is fear of the cost and
an inability to locate a suitable lawyer .... Advertising can help to solve this acknowledged
problem. ... Bates at 376, 97 S. Ct. at 2705 (footnotes omitted). This last finding is
bolstered by a national survey conducted jointly be the ABA and the American Bar
Foundation. Eighty-three percent of people questioned agreed with the statement that,
"[a] lot of people do not go to lawyers because they have no way of knowing which
lawyer is competent to handle their particular problem." B. Curran, The Legal needs of
the Public 228 (1977). Sixty-eight percent of people questioned agreed with the statement
that, "[miost lawyers charge more for their services than they are worth." Id. at 231.
37. Zaunderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2280.
38. Joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist.
39. Zauderer, 105' S. Ct. at 2294.
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It is at least somewhat incongruous for the opponents of ad-
vertising to extol the virtues and altruism of the legal profession
at one point, and at another, to assert that its members will
seize the opportunity to mislead and distort. We suspect that,
with advertising, most lawyers will behave as they always have:
They will abide by their solemn oaths to uphold the integrity
and honor of their profession and of the legal system. For every
attorney who overreaches through advertising, there will be thou-
sands of others who will be candid and honest and straight-
forward. And, of course, it will be in the latter's interest, as
in other cases of misconduct at the bar, to assist in weeding
out those few who abuse their trust. 40
Additionally, Justice O'Connor asserted that there is little difference
between in-person and newspaper solicitation because the newspaper
advertisement is the first step to get the potential client into the office
where overreaching, fraud, and deception may occur. However, this
argument fails to recognize that when a person reads an advertisement,
there is no personal pressure forcing him into the attorney's office. He
must consciously decide to go there. If he does make that decision and
goes to the attorney's office, he still is not subject to the in-person
solicitation dangers feared in Ohralik. In Ohralik, the attorney knew
what the case entailed, knew that he had a very good chance of winning,
and sought out specific victims to persuade them to employ him. When
a person reads a newspaper advertisement and decides to follow through
with an office visit, the attorney usually knows nothing of this person
or his case. The attorney therefore will exercise the same discretion and
honesty he normally employs when accepting cases referred to him by
more traditional means.
Justice O'Connor advocated prohibiting attorneys by law from doing
what she claims they ideally refrain from doing by choice. If she is
correct and attorneys would abuse the right to advertise to such an
extent that the state, through its regulations, and the bar, by reporting
offenses, could not adequately control these violations, perhaps it is
time the illusion of the attorney as a dignified professional is dissolved.
As the Bates Court said so well, "we find the postulated connection
between advertising and the erosion of true professionalism to be severely
strained. At its core, the argument presumes that attorneys must conceal
from themselves and from their clients the real-life fact that lawyers
earn their livelihood at the bar."4 1 Thus, "[s]ince the belief that lawyers
40. Bates, 433 U.S. at 379, 97 S. Ct. at 2707.
41. Id. at 368, 97 S. Ct. at 2701.
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are somehow 'above' trade has become an anachronism, the historical
foundation for the advertising restraint has crumbled." 4
Illustrations In Advertisements
Zauderer's advertisement directly violated an Ohio Disciplinary Rule
which prohibited the use of illustrations in publications by lawyers. 43
Zauderer argued that the rule violated the First Amendment by authorizing
the state to discipline him for conveying protected information without
a sufficient state interest to justify the ban.
Ohio did not contend that the illustration of the Dalkon Shield
intrauterine device (IUD) was likely to mislead or confuse readers. The
illustration in question was an accurate representation of the IUD's that
were sold by other manufacturers, and hence the picture was "a par-
ticularly important element in the ad." A woman who did not ordinarily
read such advertisements testified that she would have overlooked it
entirely except for her recognition for the Dalkon Shield.45 It is likely
that other women who were unsure as to the brand they were using
would recognize the drawing, read the advertisement, and become in-
formed of the medical problems and their legal rights. The Court found
that the drawing was an important part of the intended communication
and thus was entitled to the First Amendment protection afforded to
commercial speech.
Since the drawing was not alleged to be misleading, deceptive, or
confusing, the burden was on the state, in accordance with Central
Hudson, to establish a substantial state interest which would justify the
infringement upon Zauderer's First Amendment rights. The first interest
asserted was to ensure that attorneys advertise in a dignified manner.
The Court noted, however, that since there was no allegation that the
drawing was not "dignified," the state's interest was not thwarted by
this illustration. Furthermore, compared with the important communi-
cative purposes served by this advertisement, the alleged state interest
justified neither an abridgment of the attorney's First Amendment rights
nor the public's right to be informed. The importance of illustrations
in those advertisements which, like Zauderer's, use accurate represen-
tation to convey important information not easily conveyed in writing,
outweighs the state's desire for regulatory convenience. The Court re-
42. Id. at 371-72, 97 S. Ct. at 2703.
43. Ohio Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B) provides in pertinent part: "The information
disclosed by the lawyer in such publication (printed media, radio or television) shall ...
be presented in a dignified manner without the use of drawings, illustrations, animations
*.. or the use of pictures. ... Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at n.4.
44. Official Transcript of Zauderer at 4-5.
45. Id. at 8-9.
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affirmed its position that although some people find attorney adver-
tisements offensive and some attorneys consider advertising beneath their
dignity, those reactions do not justify suppressing the free flow of
communication protected under the First Amendment."
Concerning the use of illustrations in advertisements, Ohio advanced
arguments similar to those asserted with regard to written advertisements
and alleged that, "abuses associated with the visual content of advertising
are particularly difficult to police, because the advertiser is skilled in
subtle uses of illustrations to play on the emotions of his audience and
convey false impressions. '47 Ohio argued that it could not accurately
police the subconscious effects of illustrations on the public, and that
the only way to protect the public from manipulative illustrations was
by a complete ban.
Again, the Court was unpersuaded by this argument, since the state
provided no evidence to back up any of its assertions that a prophylactic
rule is the only way to combat the problem. One the contrary, unlike
other advertising where an object is for sale, attorneys advertise services
which are not as conducive to representation by illustrations. The Court
again referred to FTC, which has not found the task of policing visually
deceptive advertising an impossible one. Thus, in rejecting both asserted
state interests, the Court held: "Given the possibility of policing the
use of illustrations in advertisements on a case-by-case basis, the pro-
phylactic approach taken by Ohio cannot stand; hence, appellant may
not be disciplined for his use of an accurate and nondeceptive illus-
tration. '48
Disclosure Requirements
The Supreme Court of Ohio also held that Zauderer's Dalkon Shield
advertisement failed to comply with Ohio's disclosure requirement for
advertisements mentioning contingent fee rates. Disciplinary Rule 2-
101(B)(15) provided that certain contingent fee information could be
published including contingent fee rates, "provided that the statement
discloses whether percentages are computed before or after deduction
of court costs and expenses." 49
Zauderer attempted to equate disclosure requirements with restric-
tions on free speech, but the Court dismissed this argument as
"overlook[ing] material differences. "10 The main difference being the
46. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2280.
47. Id. at 2280.
48. Id. at 2281.
49. Id. at 2272 n.4.
50. Id. at 2281.
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Court's preference for more speech rather than public ignorance.51 Rather
than prohibiting speech, disclosure requirements demand that attorneys
give all the information needed to present the public with a complete
picture, thereby ensuring that advertisements are less likely to be mis-
leading. Since the First Amendment protection afforded to commercial
speech is principally due to the communicative value of the speech to
the consumer, an attorney's protected interest is at its minimum when
the attorney desires to withhold information from the public. For this
reason, disclosure requirements are not subject to a Central Hudson
scrutiny. Consequently, Zauderer could not evade the disclosure require-
ment by showing merely that a less restrictive means was available.
The Court did leave room for review of disclosure requirements by
stating that "unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements
might offend the First Amendment by chilling protected commercial
speech." 52 But, the Court held, as long as the requirement is reasonably
related to the State's interest in preventing deception, the advertiser's
rights are protected. Based on this reasoning, the Court found Disci-
plinary Rule 2-101(B)(15) constitutional and upheld the public reprimand.
Zauderer was also reprimanded for violating Disciplinary Rule 2-101(A),
which provided: "A lawyer shall not, on behalf of himself, his partner,
associate or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, use, or
participate in the use of, any form of public communication containing
a false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-laudatory or unfair state-
ment or claim."5 3
Zauderer's advertisement did not disclose the difference between legal
fees and costs. Since most people do not know the distinction between
costs and fees in this context, Zauderer's advertisement may have ap-
peared to many to offer a no-lose proposition. 4 Based on this non-
disclosure, the Court found Zauderer's advertisement misleading and
upheld the public reprimand.
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion on this issue takes a different
view.55 He notes that Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B)(15) provided that when
contingent fee rates are given, disclosure was required. The Dalkon
Shield advertisement did not mention any rates56 and therefore, by its
51. "In any event, we view as dubious any justification (for regulation) that is based
on the benefits of public ignorance .... Although, of course, the bar retains the power
to correct omissions that have the effect of presenting an inaccurate picture, the preferred
remedy is more disclosure, rather than less." Bates, 433 U.S. at 375 (citations omitted).
52. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2282.
53. Id. at 2272 n.3.
54. Zauderer's advertisement stated, "if there is no recovery, no legal fees are owed
by our clients." See text accompanying supra note I.
55. Joined by Justice Marshall.
56. See text accompanying supra note 1.
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own terms, the rule did not apply. He stated that the majority's failure
to reverse the disclosure requirements reprimand creates significant due
process and First Amendment problems, since before the state may punish
a person for violating a disciplinary rule, the behavior being punished
must actually be proscribed by that rule. The Ohio disciplinary rule did
not require an attorney to disclose the client's liability for costs and
expenses unless contingent fee rates were mentioned. Additionally, Zau-
derer, in a prudent effort to comply with the rule, sought the advice
of representatives from the Disciplinary Counsel. Those representatives
refused to give advice as to what, if any, disclosure was required, and
furthermore, there was no precedent interpreting the rule as requiring
disclosure absent the mention of rates. Nevertheless, Zauderer was pub-
licly reprimanded for violating Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B)(15).
As stated in Connally v. General Construction Company, a regulation
that "either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process
of law." '57 Justice Brennan stated, "this requirement 'applies with par-
ticular force in review of laws dealing with speech. . . 'a man may be
the less required to act at his peril here, because the free dissemination
of ideas may be the loser."' '8 Apart from violating the notice requirement
of the due process clause, reprimanding attorneys for conduct not directly
proscribed by statute, will certainly produce a "chilling" effect on
commercial speech.59
The majority handled this entire problem in a footnote.60 The Court
acknowledged that the rule, on its face, did not require any disclosure
absent mention of contingent fee rates, and characterized the Ohio
Supreme Court's vague opinion on what disclosure is required as "un-
fortunate." Further, the majority recognized the significant due process
concerns which would have arisen had this been a disbarment proceeding.
But since the punishment at issue was only a public reprimand and the
57. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2289, citing Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S.
385, 391, 46 S. Ct. 126, 127 (1926).
58. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2290, citing Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610,
620, 96 S. Ct. 1755, 1760 (1976) and Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151, 80 S. Ct.
215, 218 (1959).
59. It was argued in Bates that commercial advertising was not susceptible to the
same "chilling effect" that noncommercial speech is subject to because commercial speech
is motivated by monetary gain that outweighs any punishment received for exceeding the
prescribed parameters of permissible speech. Attorney advertising was previously grouped
with commercial speech in this regard. But when attorneys may be publicly reprimanded
for their first violation and indefinitely suspended or disbarred after only the second
violation, attorneys will be extremely reluctant to advertise unless the rules are clear and
applied as they are written.
60. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2283 n.15.
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attorney's livelihood is not at stake, the Court concluded that there was
"no infirmity."
Justice Brennan found the majority's distinction, "thoroughly un-
convincing,' '6 and he pointed out that in R.M.J., Primus, and Bates,
punishments of both equal and lesser severity were struck down when
found to be in contravention of an attorney's constitutional rights. 62
Justice Brennan further noted that in Ohio, once publicly reprimanded,
an attorney subsequently found guilty of misconduct may be suspended
from practice for an indefinite time or permanently disbarred, casting
this reprimand in a much more serious light.63
While the majority in Zauderer upheld the public reprimand on
grounds that it was both misleading and failed to comply with disclosure
requirements, and while Justice Brennan would reverse both reprimands,'
there is another alternative: After pointing out that the disclosure re-
quirement rule did not apply to Zauderer, the Court could have en-
couraged the use of disclosure requirements by states as an alternative
to prohibiting or restricting commercial speech by attorneys, and should
have instructed states to construct their disciplinary rules accordingly to
eliminate any due process and first amendment problems.
The remaining public reprimand based on Disciplinary Rule 2-101(A)
could have been sustained by adopting the definition of "misleading"
advocated by Court in oral arguments as, "not only if it affirmatively
represents something but if it fails to state a material fact which would
have been required to make it completely true."' 65 Under this definition,
Zauderer's Dalkon Shield advertisement was misleading under Rule 2-
101(A), since by not disclosing that costs and expenses were to be paid
by the client even if the suit was lost, the advertisement could lead one
to believe that hiring an attorney on a contingency fee basis is a cost-
free endeavor. Because the advertisement was misleading and violative
of the Ohio statute, a public reprimand on that ground was justified
under a Central Hudson analysis. Thus, where a misleading solicitation
is concerned a state clearly has the right to regulate and restrict its
occurrence.6
61. Id. at 2291.
62. It is particularly interesting to note that the Zauderer majority emphasized the
difference between the public reprimand issued to Zauderer, and one specifying fewer
infractions. The majority stated: "A reprimand that specified fewer infractions would be
a different punishment and would be a lesser deterrent to future advertising." Id. at 2274
n.6.
63. Id. at 2291.
64. Justice Brennan would not find Zauderer's Dalkon Shield advertisement to be
misleading, because there was nothing in the record to indicate that it was actually
misleading. Id. at 2290.
65. Official Transcript of Zauderer at 34.
66. Prior to running the Dalkon Shield advertisement, Zauderer had run another
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Residual State Rights
Because the Court strained to apply the Ohio disclosure requirement
in Zauderer, the most obvious effect of this opinion is to encourage
states to regulate attorney advertising through disclosure requirements
rather than through prohibitions or other restrictions. The Court ac-
knowledged disclosure requirements as a form of state regulation not
subject to a Central Hudson analysis, since disclosure requirements man-
date that the attorney divulge information sufficient to ensure that the
potential client makes an informed decision. This is entirely consonant
with the Court's view that the remedy for public ignorance regarding
attorneys is more speech rather than no speech. States may find this
method particularly valuable since the Court stated that no less restrictive
means can be introduced when a disclosure requirement is used.
Only days after the Zauderer decision was handed down, the Supreme
Court denied writs in Committee of Professional Standards v. Von
Wiegen. 67 Von Wiegen involved direct mail solicitation by an attorney
to victims of the Hyatt Regency skywalk collapse in Kansas City. While
noting the inherent dangers present in Ohralik, the New York Court of
Appeals held that the state could not impose a blanket prohibition on
all mailings to potential clients." With this writ denial, the Court seems
to have left the door open for direct mail solicitation by attorneys,
newspaper advertisement which read: "Full legal fee refunded if convicted of DRUNK
DRIVING. Expert witness (chemist) fees must be paid, "followed by the name, address,
and phone number of Zauderer's firm. Appellant's Brief, Fiche 70, Docket No. 83-2166,
1985 term.
After the advertisement had run for two days, a representative of the Ohio Disciplinary
Counsel informed Zauderer that the advertisement violated a provision of the disciplinary
rules. Zauderer apologized, immediately withdrew the advertisement, and promised not to
accept employment by people responding to it. A few months later, Zauderer launched
a much more comprehensive advertising campaign with the newspaper advertisement in
the text. When suit was filed on the Dalkon Shield advertisement, charges were also
brought on the drunk driving advertisement.
Zauderer asserted a violation of his due process rights since the Supreme Court of
Ohio publicly reprimanded him for violating of a different disciplinary rule than the one
which the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline originally held he had
violated. The Zauderer majority, however, dismissed the alleged due process violation by
pointing out that the Supreme Court of Ohio has the ultimate authority to reprimand
and that the charges put Zauderer on notice of the charges in the Ohio Supreme Court's
opinion. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2283-84.
Justice Brennan vehemently disagreed largely because the Ohio Supreme Court could
only conduct a limited record review of the Commissioner's findings, did not hear the
case de novo, and did not give Zauderer the opportunity to present additional evidence.
Id. at 2293.
67. Committee on Professional Standards v. Von Wiegen, 105 S. Ct. 2701 (1985).
68. Committee on Professional Standards v. Von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d 163, 470 N.E.2d
838, 481 N.Y.S.2d 40 (N.Y. 1984), cert. denied 105 S. Ct. 2701 (1985).
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perhaps seeing no more inherent danger in this form of solicitation than
with newspaper advertisements, or at least not a sufficient level to require
a different result.
Another important aspect of attorney advertising, an issue expressly
reserved in Bates, is the special problem associated with advertising on
electronic broadcast media which the Bates Court said would "warrant
special consideration." 69 The Zauderer Court also left this issue unre-
solved, but subsequently the Court vacated the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Iowa in Humphrey v. Committee on Professional Ethics, 70 and
remanded for further consideration in light of Zauderer. The Iowa
Supreme Court had upheld the constitutionality of its rule prohibiting
television advertisements that contain "background sound, visual dis-
plays, more than a single, non-dramatic voice or self-laudatory state-
ments. '"' This remand indicates that even television advertising may
not possess enough of the dangers associated with in-person solicitation
to justify the curtailment of first amendment freedoms.
Bates and Zauderer also left open the question of self-laudatory
statements. Bates, without deciding the issue, stated that claims as to
the quality of services offered were not susceptible of measurement or
verification and may be "so likely to be misleading as to warrant
restriction. 7 2 The Zauderer Court was careful to note that Zauderer's
advertisement did not guarantee the success of a lawsuit, nor did it
suggest that Zauderer had any special expertise. in this field. It merely
stated a fact, that Zauderer's firm was presently handling other similar
claims.
Did the Court in vacating Humphrey intend reconsideration of the
self-laudatory ban as well as the ban on visuals and background sounds?
Because the Court took care in characterizing Zauderer's advertisement
as not being self-laudatory, it is unlikely that it intended to open this
area of attorney advertising as well. The justification for visual aids in
attorney advertising, the value of the information to the public, is not
present when the attorney merely asserts that he is skilled. One would
hope that since all attorneys go through the rigors of law school and
bar exams, they would all be capable of doing a fine job. However,
self-laudatory statements which go beyond the mere assertion that an
attorney possesses the degree of skill commonly possessed by other
attorneys similarly situated, when made by the attorney himself or one
affiliated with him, may well prompt the Court to approve a complete
69. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384, 97 S. Ct. at 2709.
70. Humphrey v. Committee on Professional Ethics of the Iowa State Bar Ass'n,
105 S. Ct. 2693 (1985).
71. Humphrey v. Committee on Professional Ethics of the Iowa State Bar Ass'n,
355 N.W.2d 565, 566 (Iowa 1984).
72. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383-84, 97 S. Ct. at 2709.
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ban on these communications due to the particular dangers associated
with this type of "puffing."
The same reasoning does not apply, however, when dealing simply
with the information regarding firm specialization or types of cases
presently handled. These are easily verifiable facts which would be very
helpful to the person seeking legal assistance for a particular problem.
Once the Court in Virginia State Pharmacy Board recognized that com-
mercial speech involves reciprocal rights, those of the speaker and those
of the listener, the door was opened for attorney advertising." The Bates
Court, while recognizing that advertising is not the complete answer to
the public's need for information relevant to their legal needs, stated,
"it seems peculiar to deny the consumer, on the ground that the in-
formation is incomplete, at least some of the relevant information needed
to reach an informed decision." 74
The Zauderer decision does not detract from the earlier statements
of states' rights to restrict false, deceptive, or misleading advertisements,
or advertisements proposing involvement in illegal transactions. Reason-
able time, place, and manner restrictions which directly advance a sig-
nificant state interest while leaving open alternative channels of
communication also remain in tact."
More importantly, however, a new form of regulation short of a
complete ban has been sanctioned by the Court, the disclosure require-
ment. There are at least two approaches to the use of disclosure re-
quirements. The first is for a state to affirmatively adopt a specific
requirement. The second is for the judiciary to recognize the duty of
all advertisements to disclose all information needed to give the reader
an accurate representation, the lack of which should render it misleading
and subject the advertiser to discipline according to state law.
Attorney's Right to Advertise
After Zauderer, attorneys are permitted to solicit business through
printed advertising, as long as those advertisements are truthful, non-
deceptive, nonfraudulent, and do not propose involvement in an illegal
transaction. After Von Wiegen, this apparently includes direct mailing
to known victims for monetary gain. These advertisements may still,
however, be subject to reasonable state regulation that directly advances
a substantial governmental interest.
Despite Von Wiegen, the direct mailing issue has not been directly
addressed by the Court, and therefore, an attorney should avoid using
any language in advertisements which creates an inference that pressure
73. Virginia State Pharmacy Board, 425 U.S. at 756-57, 96 S. Ct. at 1822-23.
74. Bates, 433 U.S. at 374, 97 S. Ct. at 2704.
75. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2275.
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is being exerted on the receiver. The Court may well find such an
advertisement overreaching.
Moreover, an attorney should avoid any self-laudatory statements
about himself or any attorney with whom he is affiliated, when made
for the purpose of solicitation. An attorney should be aware of and
broadly construe any disclosure requirements his state may have, since
the United States Supreme Court has found them applicable even when
they do not apply by their own terms. Most importantly, an attorney
should stick to easily verifiable facts; when advertising with contingency
fee agreements, he should disclose the client's liability for costs and
expenses; and finally, an attorney should avoid anything which, by either
affirmative statements or omissions, might be seen as misleading, de-
ceptive, or proposing involvement in an illegal transaction.
Conclusion
Zauderer is important as a reaffirmation of the Supreme Court's
recognition of the dilemma created by the public's ignorance regarding
legal services. The Court has seemingly laid to rest the dignity interest
traditionally asserted as the justification for the attorney advertising ban,
finding the need to inform the public much more compelling. The
disclosure requirement has been approved as a method of state regulation
over the content of attorney advertisements. However, Zauderer may
well be a larger victory for state regulation than for the recognition of
an attorney's first amendment freedoms. The Zauderer Court's appli-
cation of Ohio's disclosure requirements when there was no indication
of their applicability may chill an attorney's inclination to advertise,
thus discouraging the dissemination of information to the public.
Jennifer T. Elmer
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